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In the summer of 1973, while watching John Dean’s testimony in the 
Watergate trial at his vacation house in rural Vermont, John Kenneth Galbraith 
received an unexpected telephone call. On the other end of the line was Adrian 
Malone, a producer with the BBC who had become known for developing 
multipart historical documentaries of notable ambition and expense 
(Galbraith 1981c, 528). Most recently Malone had completed The Ascent of 
Man, a thirteen-part series on the history of science that had attracted glowing 
reviews and turned its central figure, Jacob Bronowski, into a household name. 
Malone was now shifting his attention to the history of the social sciences and 
commencing the project of presenting the subject’s notoriously abstract 
themes to a mass audience on the small screen. Malone informed Galbraith 
that he would be the ideal person to guide such an enterprise. The reasons for 
this choice, as a later proposal noted, were readily evident: Galbraith was 
“that rare being, a practical philosopher.” He was “an authority who stands 
outside, but is respected by those with political power,” benefited from “a world-
wide reputation,” and maintained the capacity to “entertain ideas and 
experiments from both ends of any spectrum, radical or reactionary.”  
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Galbraith transcended the conventional divisions between academia and 
politics, and between abstract debates in the social sciences and a mass 
audience. Malone, who was a vocal admirer of the eighteenth-century 
French philosopher, declared his chosen star a “modern Voltaire.”1 
For Galbraith, deciding how to respond to Malone’s offer was not easy. 
There were, of course, many reasons to find it appealing. Unlike many of his 
fellow economists, Galbraith was not known for his distaste for celebrity: as a 
frequently photographed confidante to Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and a 
television presence on Today, Firing Line, and the political coverage on the 
network news, he had already become known in the popular press as a 
“resident pundit” and “house liberal” who was in danger of “overexposure” 
(Meyer 1977). Accusing his academic colleagues of confusing obscurity with 
rigor, Galbraith had instead directed his writings toward a mass public, and 
his many appearances on the best seller lists were a testament to his 
successes. He found television’s capacity to reach a still-broader audience 
alluring and may have seen some romantic appeal in the prospect of 
traveling the world as a television star. At the same time, accepting the offer 
would force him to leave Harvard only two years before he reached 
retirement age, which might imply an unwanted hint of bitterness at an 
economics department within which he had long been marginalized (Parker 
2005, 517). He would need to teach himself an elaborate new medium at an 
age when he had expected to be spending more time in rural repose and skiing 
in Gstaad. And for a figure who had already achieved international literary 
renown, tackling such an unusual enterprise entailed some risk of appearing 
a fool. Colleagues who expressed skepticism of his mass-market books were 
likely to find television more dubious still. “It’s the instinctive reaction of 
writers—perhaps they feel threatened,” he later recalled. “The feeling is that 
if something is done in pictures, done visually, it’s inherently inferior than if 
it had been done in words, in print.”2 
Flattered and intrigued by the opportunity, Galbraith decided to set aside 
his reservations and accept it. In doing so, he became the first economist to 
engage in an ambitious, long-form attempt to relay economic ideas to a popular 
audience via a visual medium. He was well aware that this challenge would 
not be easily met. Malone had been clear from the outset that television was a 
“blunt instrument,” requiring a simplified form of exposition that did not 
 
1 “A PRE-OFFER,” box 567, folder “BBC program correspondence: BBC: early [1973],” John 
Kenneth Galbraith Papers, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston (hereafter cited as Galbraith Papers). 
2 Cecil Smith, “John Galbraith Feels Certain about Success of ‘Age of Uncertainty,’” Miami 
Herald TV Preview (undated), box 566, folder “BBC program: articles [general],” Galbraith 
Papers. 
easily align with Galbraith’s patrician persona and ironic sensibility (Parker 
2005, 517). But Galbraith also knew that the discipline of economics, despite 
its reputation for tedious abstraction, had become a site of intense public 
interest and engagement. With the profession buoyed by the prestige of its new 
association with the Nobel Prize and made relevant by debates over inflation 
and stalled economic growth, the time seemed right for an economist to 
explain the discipline to those who sensed its importance but did not have the 
time or patience to learn much of it in books. 
Galbraith was not the only one in his profession to sense the propitiousness 
of the moment and the potential of the medium. He commenced work on the 
documentary series that would become The Age of Uncertainty in an era when 
a growing number of corporations, advocacy organizations, and think tanks 
were engaging in concerted attempts to convince popular audiences of the 
merits of free market ideas. Sensitive to their own perceived marginalization, 
they observed the production process for Galbraith’s incipient series with 
evident alarm. Seeking to discredit and displace his arguments, they turned 
to Milton Friedman, who had in recent years become Galbraith’s most 
prominent opponent in the public sphere. Like Galbraith, Friedman 
demonstrated a facility for popular journalism and routinely embraced 
opportunities to influence public opinion on matters of political concern. 
Although the two men were neighbors in Vermont and referred to each other 
as friends, their distaste for each other’s views had become evident in their 
frequent sparring sessions in columns and editorials. It was therefore no 
surprise that Friedman, at the request of colleagues at a think tank in London, 
met the release of The Age of Uncertainty with a public lecture that was 
intended to discredit its claims. And not long thereafter—at the urging of a 
public television executive who had been converted to his views—Friedman 
developed and released a competitive multipart documentary of his own, Free 
to Choose, which would (in conjunction with a companion volume) become the 
most popular and widely disseminated introduction to his ideas. 
At this moment of unusually intense debate over economic policy, the most 
prominent public exemplars of left and right-wing economic views therefore 
found themselves engaged in competing attempts to reach a mass audience 
through the maturing medium of television. An exploration of their efforts helps 
address several crucial aspects of the popularization of economic ideas over 
the final decades of the twentieth century. Such efforts, it will become 
apparent, were deeply embedded in institutional structures that varied quite 
extensively for economists of differing views. Although writers of books rely 
on networks of colleagues, assistants, editors, and publishers, the act of 
writing itself is often solitary, and social connections can be relegated to an 
ancillary or intermediary role. The apparent intimacy of television, by 
contrast, obscures the enormous administrative and technical complexity of 
the production process. Beginning in its earliest stages, a television 
documentary series requires substantial funding, specialized expertise, and 
the support of programming executives. Even the inceptions of Galbraith’s and 
Friedman’s series were not attributable to them: both were approached and 
propositioned by individuals within the industry who had become enchanted 
with their ideas. And the quality of the productions remained largely at the 
mercy of colleagues who possessed technical competencies that Galbraith and 
Friedman were not fully equipped to evaluate. This rapidly evolving media 
environment required institutions to play a thicker and more constitutive role 
than had been the case in a public sphere that depended primarily on literary 
production. The advocacy of economic ideas now involved much more than 
simply stating them. 
The medium itself also posed a unique set of problems, which rewarded 
certain modes of presentation while rendering others ineffective. Print 
effaces the personal and allows for the construction of an identity that 
transcends physical appearance and comportment. Television is not so kind. 
Now, new details mattered: height, accent, inflection, eye contact, clothing, 
and spontaneity of exposition. Economists who appeared regularly on 
television became personalities, and their audiences came to see their self-
presentations as deeply entwined with their representations of their ideas. 
But even as the medium made economists’ personal traits more vivid, it had 
the capacity to render their ideas more turgid. Its format is unforgiving toward 
theory, jargon, or extended exposition. A discipline that functions by 
abstracting from the social accords at best uneasily with a medium that thrives 
on personalizing the abstract. Even those historians of economic thought who 
are most attuned to problems of transmission tend to focus on written 
exposition, but in this new era the personal instantiation and visual expression 
of economic ideas would play a crucial role in conditioning their reception. 
To emphasize the importance of the visual is not to imply the insignificance 
of language. Here, as elsewhere, rhetoric mattered. Television producers are 
impatient with elaborate caveats and justifications, and seek to induce 
performers to arrive quickly at a compelling distillation of their ideas. The 
contrast between Galbraith’s and Friedman’s responses to this imperative was 
stark. In The Age of Uncertainty, Galbraith attempted to bring to television 
the ironic sensibility, attuned to paradox, that had long served him well in his 
literary productions. His elaborate contrasts and attempts at mordant humor 
withered on the screen, and he found himself criticized by television 
audiences for the very academicism that he had long deplored. Friedman 
instead relied on a simple exposition of the market metaphor, rendering it 
tangible through carefully chosen human examples that appeared to validate 
his ideas. The rediscovery of the market unfolded, in part, as a plebiscite on 
these dueling representations of the economic world. 
The eventual outcomes, of course, were lopsided: as Galbraith’s public 
career continued its gradual eclipse, Friedman rapidly ascended to become the 
leading economic prophet of the final decades of the twentieth century. 
Galbraith may have labeled this the “age of uncertainty,” but it would prove 
kindest to those economists who offered the absence thereof. 
 
When Galbraith and Malone began work on The Age of Uncertainty, they 
were seeking to adapt an approach to long-form documentary that had been 
refined by the BBC in the previous half decade—in Kenneth Clark’s 
pioneering history of art, Civilisation (1969); Alistair Cooke’s history of the 
United States, America (1972); and Jacob Bronowski’s history of scientific 
thought, The Ascent of Man (1973)—to new subject matter. These massively 
expensive and thematically rich series had taken advantage of the increasing 
prevalence of new technologies, including higher-band UHF signals and 
color (introduced by BBC2 in 1964 and 1967, respectively), to take on 
subjects of greater visual complexity and topical ambition than were 
conventionally associated with the medium (Briggs 1985, 360; Crisell 1997, 
115, 117). Seeking to tie a broad and diffuse range of historical material 
together, the director Michael Gill had relied on jet travel in Civilisation to 
adopt a striking technique: a central narrator would simply materialize at the 
location under discussion, instantly traversing vast distances multiple times 
in a single show (Barnouw 1993, 315). Enormous time, effort, and resources 
were leveraged to develop programs that elided their necessity by projecting 
an impression of ease. The effect was miraculous, and audiences that had 
been habituated to the parochial television offerings of the time observed 
these expansive new productions with awe. The most cynical among them 
wondered why such ambitious cultural programming seemed always to 
originate from the BBC. As a review of The Age of Uncertainty in the January 
19, 1977, issue of Variety observed, “Adult education as riveting 
entertainment is seemingly an English video patent.” A critic in the 
Washington Post was less circumspect: series like America and 
Civilisation, he remarked, made one wonder why there was “so much idiocy 
on American TV” (Mitchell 1974). 
Malone, as his colleague Geoff Haines-Stiles later recalled, was a man of 
“grandiose ambitions” who believed himself to be engaged in the development 
of a new cultural form: the “creative documentary,” a mode of presentation 
that was “just different from other forms of communication” and capable of 
achieving “some things that books can’t” (Dornfeld 1998, 44). At times this 
self-conception inspired Malone to drift into descriptive excess, as in his 
peculiar assertion in an offering sheet that if “Voltaire lived today he would 
want to do a thirteen part television series along the intellectual lines of 
Candide.” But television executives found his goal of doing “for social 
evolution what ‘The Ascent of Man’ did for cultural evolution” compelling, 
and Malone had little difficulty in convincing the BBC to provide primary 
support for his proposed $2 million budget.3 Time-Life, which had 
cosponsored The Ascent of Man, proved more skeptical of the project, for 
reasons related to Galbraith’s political inclinations rather than the subject 
matter itself. As its executives observed to Malone, Galbraith would have 
difficulty finding underwriters for a series that would likely yield conclusions 
unpopular with corporate decision makers.4 PBS, however, saw the long-form 
documentary as a format that differentiated the still-nascent network from its 
commercial competitors and offered to contribute $720,000 to the development 
of the series (Dornfeld 1998, 42; Kelley 1977). In conjunction with the 
$300,000 contributed by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and $150,000 
from the Ontario Educational Communications Authority, this ensured that 
the necessary funding had been raised.5 These resources would enable three 
years of work on the series, with a full production team assembling thirteen 
episodes out of scenes shot from locations around the world. 
When the series finally appeared on English television in 1977, public 
expectations were high. In a sometimes lightweight popular culture, the 
Birmingham Evening Mail remarked that Galbraith was likely to serve as a 
new “‘heavy’ star” (“Figuring to Be a Star” 1977). The Daily Mail added 
that Galbraith would receive the “superstar treatment” in BBC2’s “prestige 
series of the year” (Rees 1977). Malone’s vision was still grander: he saw the 
series as one that should remain relevant for “at least ten to twenty years.”6 
Galbraith therefore found himself “puzzled,” and a little dismayed, when 
 
3 “A PRE-OFFER,” Galbraith Papers. 
4 Adrian Malone to John Kenneth Galbraith, December 14, 1973, box 567, folder “The Age of 
Uncertainty: BBC program correspondence: BBC: early [1973],” Galbraith Papers. 
5 Graham Fraser, “Be Patient, Good Viewer, and Uncle Ken Will Make It All Make Sense” 
(publication and date unknown), box 581, folder “The Age of Uncertainty: BBC program reviews: 
Canadian,” Galbraith Papers. 
6 “A PRE-OFFER,” Galbraith Papers. 
the initial reviews registered a response that ranged from tepid to scathing.7 
Conservative publications lambasted Galbraith’s perspective: the Daily 
Telegraph called the series a “hymn of hate,” and the Spectator brushed it 
aside as a “banality” (Last 1977; Ingrams 1977). Other critics observed that 
Galbraith had failed to make a smooth transition from the written word to 
television: the Crew Chronicle preferred the book version of the series, flatly 
stating that it was “better in print,” and the Times concluded that the only 
virtue of the programs was “as a commercial on behalf of” the transcripts 
serialized in the Listener (“TV Series Better in Print” 1977; Church 1977). 
One British reviewer noted that “little is left unshaken of Prof. Galbraith’s 
reputation as a scholar, if not as a television personality.”8 Witnessing the 
reception in England, the New York Times acerbically noted that the series 
was “not, in any case, the subject of dinner table banter” (Kilborn 1977). 
Although a few British critics expressed more favorable views of the series, it 
was difficult for those assessing the response to the series not to conclude with 
the New York Times that “this time” the BBC’s “formula” had failed 
(O’Connor 1977). 
There was no single reason for the series’ perceived failure: as with 
many productions of this kind, its problems were complex and interrelated. 
They began, however, with Galbraith’s attempt to address abstract social 
theories through a historical analysis. The series proceeded as a march 
through great thinkers, from Adam Smith and the classical economists 
through Karl Marx and John Maynard Keynes up to contemporary times, 
providing Galbraith’s abbreviated assessments of their theoretical 
contributions and the contexts in which they wrote. There was never any 
question that this would be the animating concept behind the series: its 
predecessors at the BBC had all structured their episodes around an 
advancing chronology, and Galbraith himself saw it as an opportunity to 
provide needed attention to an often-overlooked subject. “The history of 
economic thought has been a declining subject both in the universities and in 
the public eye,” he told Focus magazine in 1976. “This will be something to 
revive interest” (“John Kenneth Galbraith” 1976). In a letter to the History of 
Economic Thought Newsletter, he expressed optimism that the series would 
draw attention to issues that had long been neglected by economics 
departments that had become ever more narrowly focused on the problems of 
 
7 John Kenneth Galbraith to Aubrey Singer, May 5, 1977, box 567, folder “The Age of 
Uncertainty: BBC program: correspondence: BBC, July 1977–February 1976,” Galbraith 
Papers. 
8 Colin Welch, “The Rich Wot Gets the Blame,” box 566, folder “The Age of Uncertainty: 
BBC program articles [general],” Galbraith Papers. 
the present day.9 
Galbraith, however, had risen to fame as an overtly partisan political 
economist, creating an awkward problem for his attempts to adopt a more 
distanced historicism. Malone addressed this by seeking to avoid any overt sense 
that the series was structured around the star’s contemporary political views. 
“The feeling should be of objectivity, assuming no god-given truths,” he wrote 
in an early outline.10 And Galbraith tried to adapt himself to this new role: as 
the series was released, he emphasized his detachment from contemporary 
politics and referred to himself as “essentially a middle-of-the-road figure” 
(Henry 1977a). But shortly after the first episodes were released, conservative 
commentators began expressing their dissatisfaction with perceived 
distortions of the historical record. Was not the treatment of Marx notably 
more charitable than those of his classical predecessors?11 Why did Galbraith 
draw attention to the foibles of the capitalists that Thorstein Veblen criticized 
but not the obvious personal shortcomings of Veblen himself (Jewkes 1977)? 
Where could one find all the equations that might be expected in a history 
of economic thought (Minogue 1977)? And in the episodes exploring the 
economics of more recent times, why were the theories of Milton Friedman 
ignored?12 As the “high priest of wage and price controls,” a “fervent 
Democrat,” and the house economist of the Kennedy family, it was difficult for 
many to see the series as anything other than a vehicle for Galbraith’s well-
known and distinctive economic views (Lyon 1976; Reed 1977). Perhaps in 
an attempt to acknowledge and defuse impressions of partiality, the series 
adopted the subtitle from the Bronowski series: “A Personal View.” But the 
“problem” that many perceived, as Newsweek wrote, was that “the view is highly 
personal” (Ruby 1977, 61; emphasis added). The Boston Globe put it more 
bluntly: “Galbraith is not scholarly, not abstract, above all not objective” 
(Henry 1977b). Kenneth Minogue (1977, 1978), a market-oriented political 
theorist at the London School of Economics, excoriated the series as “trial by 
caricature” for which the operative principle was “distortion of the past for the 
purpose of flattering the present.” In The Age of Uncertainty, Galbraith 
attempted to suppress his views in search of historical credibility that proved 
difficult for him to achieve. 
 
9 John Kenneth Galbraith, “Note on ‘The Age of Uncertainty’ for the History of Economic 
Thought Newsletter,” box 577, folder “The Age of Uncertainty: BBC program: History of 
Economic Thought Newsletter, Spring 1977,” Galbraith Papers. 
10 Adrian Malone, series outline, box 577, folder “The Age of Uncertainty: BBC program: 
outline,” Galbraith Papers. 
11 Welch, “Rich Wot Gets the Blame.” 
12 Galbraith responds to this question in a letter to the editor of the Wall Street Journal, April 
4, 1977, box 983, folder “Letters to the Editor: Wall Street Journal.” 
He therefore found himself trapped in a muddled space between the poles 
of advocacy and objectivity that had riven economics since its 
professionalization nearly a century before (Furner 1975). The foundational 
tension was evident in the choice of a title: this was a series that would draw 
its attention to “uncertainty,” or the instability of established theories and 
solutions, rather than posing its own. The grand narrative that Galbraith 
established was one of decline, as the theories of earlier political economists 
were swept aside in the wake of failed predictions and unexpected events. (In 
the halls of the BBC, the production became colloquially known as The 
Descent of Man [Rees 1977].) It was intended, as Galbraith noted in a 
contemporary interview, to reveal “how sure capitalists were of capitalism,” 
“how sure the socialists were of socialism,” how sure the European countries 
were of their dominant political position, and how sure the ruling classes of 
earlier generations were of the permanence of the social order. In exposing 
these fallacies, Galbraith hoped to draw attention to the conceptual instability 
of a postmodern age. He represented this as a great virtue of the series, which 
situated itself against those who “make the firmness of their avowal a 
substitute for the certainty of their position,” exchanging “strong affirmation 
for lack of information” (Cross 1977, 24–25). But why was Galbraith, one of 
the most formidable intellectual gladiators in the op-ed pages of his time, 
suddenly arguing against a posture of certainty in the face of incomplete 
information? The title was surely an “irony,” the Washington Post observed, 
“for a man who is rarely in doubt” (Nossiter 1977). This new posture, while 
perhaps more nuanced, posed some rhetorical challenges: as the world 
confronted successive waves of economic crisis in the late 1970s, audiences 
proved reluctant to listen to a prophet who now dwelled on the absence of 
readily available solutions. Milton Friedman, in viewing the series, drew 
attention to the limitations of Galbraith’s critical-historical posture. “I looked 
in vain for a central idea,” he observed. “All I could see was a man sneering at 
conventional solutions, without offering any of his own” (quoted in Holden 
1980).  
Galbraith’s historical subject matter posed another problem: how does 
one find visual material to accompany discussions about the history of 
economics? As one critic observed, “Art and science lend themselves to 
pictures,” providing ample fodder for Clark and Bronowski, “but economics—
the dismal science—does not” (Meyer 1977). There were no rich tapestries or 
complex inventions for the camera to linger on during Galbraith’s extended 
narrations. The search for visual expression posed an insuperable challenge, as 
the New Statesman observed, for a discipline in which the “greatest exponents 
have scarcely been able to express their ideas in intelligible prose” (Porteous 
1977). In deciding how to overcome this problem, Galbraith and Malone made 
a crucial decision. Rather than relying primarily on shots set on contemporary 
locations and historical images and video, they would hire actors to reenact 
many of the scenes and situations that Galbraith described. Much of the series 
was devoted to elaborately costumed actors silently enacting their relations 
in exaggerated poses while Galbraith described the leading economic theories 
of the time. Thus viewers were shown a re-creation of the famous banquet at 
Delmonico’s in which actors dressed as waiters served stuffed life-sized dolls 
circling a table, in an elaborate play on Henry Ward Beecher’s reference to the 
diners’ “continually stuffed bodies”; or extended studio images from a 
metaphorical carnival, to demonstrate the so-called carnival  ride set off by 
the rise of money.13 
The reliance on exaggerated historical reenactments prevented Galbraith 
from adopting a posture of empiricism: rather than a detached observer of 
economic truths, he appeared as a roving master of elaborate visual fictions. 
The opening scene of The Age of Uncertainty, in a stunning moment of 
trompe l’oeil, overtly cast him as a conjurer of artifices rather than a teller of 
social-scientific truths. Galbraith began by speaking about the role of 
economic ideas in history in terms that most viewers would have presumed 
to be his own before he slyly revealed them to have been written by Keynes. 
Galbraith then stated, as the camera receded to reveal a stately Oxbridgian 
backdrop, that he was addressing his audience from Keynes’s rooms at King’s 
College. The camera, however, continued to recede, demonstrating that this 
too was a mirage, and he was instead delivering his lines from a tiny set in the 
midst of a vast black box theater. This was all, Galbraith announced, a 
“theatrical impression,” one of the many that would be used to illuminate his 
views. “The illusions of the theatre—and film—have long been used to give 
substance to abstraction, visual form to ideas.” As he stated these words, a set 
of costumed characters moved beneath his feet in rehearsed postures over a 
map of Europe. They were the “participants in the parade,” subjected to “the 
carnival of boom and slump,” and Galbraith was the showman who 
assembled and ordered the spectacle for the viewers watching from the quiet 
of their homes.14 Most documentaries elide the process of their own 
construction, and few commence with such an overt statement of narrative 
 
13 John Kenneth Galbraith, transcripts, “The Morals & Manners of High Capitalism” and “The 
Rise and Fall of Money,” The Age of Uncertainty, BBC. 
14 John Kenneth Galbraith, transcript, “The Prophets and Promise of Classical Capitalism,” 
The Age of Uncertainty, BBC. 
control. This, it seemed, would be a reflexive documentary: one that engaged 
in a metacommentary on its own construction and thereby encouraged readers 
to reflect on the partiality of its representation (Nichols 1991, 56). Galbraith, 
who already attracted some derision as a literary practitioner of an increasingly 
mathematical profession, would appear here as a weaver of narratives rather 
than a conduit for facts. He would not take advantage of the appearance of 
empiricism afforded by the visual form. 
Few viewers, however, saw the reflexivity of The Age of Uncertainty as a 
sign of methodological sophistication; instead, most simply wondered why 
the costumes and sets were so unconvincing and the acting was so bad. The 
depiction of symbolic royalty, capitalists, and peasants in metaphorical dances 
on a giant map of Europe struck many, in the words of one critic, as “so 
puerile as to make me cringe with embarrassment.”15 Galbraith, who had 
granted authority to the BBC for the visual aspects of the series at the outset, 
hinted at some skepticism of their creations. “Let’s never forget that one word 
is worth a thousand pictures,” he observed in the first episode, not yet aware 
of the number of reviewers who would leverage that comment to explain the 
series’ flaws.16 Observers complained that the visual accompaniments to 
Galbraith’s words were “gimmickry” (“Making It Clear as Mud” 1977), a 
“nuisance” (Birtchall 1977), and signs that the documentary series was a “Play 
School version” of Galbraith’s ideas.17 Many, including the author and critic 
Martin Amis (1977), mocked the elaborate set pieces as signs of decadence. 
“While Galbraith drawled wryly on, we were offered a restful collage of 
diagrams, cartoons, allegories, emblems, stills, mock-ups, toytowns, old 
things superimposed on new things, new things superimposed on old things, 
modern chaps dressed up in antique garb, modern chaps not dressed up in 
antique garb,” he wrote. “Soon, no doubt, these boys will have appropriate 
footage for such concepts as ‘a’ and ‘the,’ so that the viewer can simply flop back 
and let his eyes do the listening.” The extravagant and self-conscious visuals 
in The Age of Uncertainty seemed to have done little to make Galbraith’s 
arguments more rhetorically compelling for his audience. In America, George 
Stigler (1977) wrote that the documentary had fulfilled his “fears about the 
effective use of television” as a medium for economics, as Galbraith “made 
no observable attempt to use visual methods to illuminate ideas”: in England, 
 
15 Blaik Kirby, “Galbraith Series a Yawn,” box 581, folder “The Age of Uncertainty: BBC 
Program Reviews: Canadian,” Galbraith Papers. 
16 John Kenneth Galbraith, transcript, “The Prophets and Promise of Classical Capitalism,” 
Age of Uncertainty. 
17 Untitled article in Sunday Telegraph, January 16, 1977, box 1021, folder “The Age of 
Uncertainty: BBC program: reviews: [American],” Galbraith Papers. 
one observer noted that Galbraith’s visuals seemed as though they had been 
“mischievously” devised by a conservative think tank “to distract attention 
from his message.”18 Silent reenactments and composed dances, it seemed, 
were a disruptive complement to Galbraith’s narrations; in a series on the social 
sciences, viewers manifested a preference for visual economy rather than 
excess. 
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the viewer response to the series, 
however, was the perception of Galbraith himself. In searching for a star, the 
producers had high expectations: the goal, Malone told a reporter, was to find 
someone “whose opinions have mattered for the past twenty years, and will go 
on mattering for some time to come” (Rees 1977). Among those who met 
this standard, Galbraith enjoyed the added advantage of international 
celebrity and a charismatic persona. His frequent presence around famous 
women had earned him the reputation, as one publication noted, as a 
“fascinating cavalier” (Field 1971). Perhaps alone among economists, his 
television appearances brought frequent references to his “sex-appeal” (“Now 
for the Sexy Ken Galbraith Show” 1977). Cosmopolitan named him one of 
the “sexiest men in the world” (Henry 1977a), journalists described him as “a 
kind of donnish Gary Cooper” (Rees 1977), and female viewers wrote letters 
to the Times dwelling on “his sensitive hands and his ravaged sardonic 
features” (Jemal 1977). One source of this fixation was his striking height: at 
well over six and a half feet tall, he physically embodied his academic stature 
and appeared always to be “looking down at” those around him (Hampshire 
1977). Few scholars, at first blush, seemed so well suited to translate their 
discipline to a television audience.  
During his extended monologues in The Age of Uncertainty, however, it 
soon became clear that Galbraith maintained a professorial demeanor that 
did not translate easily to a mass audience. His producers had observed the 
problem when Galbraith first submitted his proposed scripts. “There wasn’t a 
sentence that didn’t have three or four ideas in it,” Malone later recalled. 
“Sometimes they got so dense that the viewer would miss the point” (Parker 
2005, 517–18). Attempts to expunge complexity were not entirely successful: 
in viewing the final product, Martin Amis (1977) marveled at Galbraith’s 
ability to state “the obvious as though it were excruciatingly, ticklishly 
oblique.” In contrast to the spontaneous enthusiasms of Bronowski, Galbraith 
seemed to deliver his lines in a “monotonous drone” (O’Connor 1977). Critics 
found him “fidgety” and “vague” (Henry 1977a); “eccentric” and “wooden” 
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(Stigler 1977); “dry,” and, perhaps most damningly, “intellectual.”19 Even his 
defenders grew tired, at times, of his aura of “self-celebration” (Reed 1977). 
These personality traits attracted some ridicule in the British press and were not 
well-received in an American context that had long been noted for its anti-
intellectualism. The best-known economic advocate of the poor seemed, in his 
public appearances, wholly alien to the people whose interests he was 
ostensibly defending. “If Galbraith would just stoop a little to hide his 
embarrassing height,” one journalist suggested, “adopt a humble, self-effacing 
personality, and disguise himself as one of those ‘people’s’ corn-belt 
Republicans, maybe someone would listen to him” (Smith 1978). Galbraith 
was condemned to purveying a populist message in elitist  form. 
Conservative intellectuals, who expressed anxiety about the impact of The 
Age of Uncertainty in the months leading up to its release, drew on a rapidly 
developing network of intellectuals, politicians, magazines, and policy 
institutions to critique the series and diminish Galbraith’s credibility. In their 
narrative, he received privileged treatment from a public media apparatus that 
uncritically supported the views of a liberal establishment. (Galbraith did not 
contest the notion that he was among the establishment, but insisted that he was 
on its “raffish fringe” [Stanley 1977].) Exploiting vulnerabilities exposed 
during the Nixon administration, they castigated the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting for deviating from its mandate, dating from the Public 
Broadcasting Act of 1967, to maintain “strict adherence to objectivity and 
balance in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature.” The 
meaning of this requirement had never been entirely clear: did it entail balance 
across all programs on the schedule, or balance within each program itself? 
And how was balance to be defined across the infinitely broad spectrum of 
possible views (Ledbetter 1997, 97)? Galbraith was quick to point out to critics 
the range of conservative perspectives that were reflected on public television 
on shows such as William F. Buckley’s long-running program Firing Line 
and Louis Rukeyser’s Wall Street Week.20 But well before The Age of 
Uncertainty appeared, his critics were already logging their dissatisfactions 
with his work in the Congressional Record. Barry Goldwater was sure that 
it would be “socialistic propaganda” and castigated the use of “taxpayer 
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money” to launch an attack on “the economic system upon which this 
country is built.”21 In the same year that the series was released, Senator Orrin 
Hatch (R-UT) pushed unsuccessfully to have a Public Broadcasting Fairness 
Act write tangible requirements for “balance” into law (Ledbetter 1997, 98). 
The effect of all this was to leave public television executives highly skittish 
about any subject deemed politically controversial. As a result of these 
concerns, executives at the public television station in Los Angeles decided—
without raising the possibility to Galbraith or the BBC—to append to each 
episode a brief critique of Galbraith’s analysis from a conservative 
perspective. To achieve this goal they turned to the Hoover Institution, which 
compiled a list of twelve prominent pundits, celebrities, and experts who 
were willing to add a few recriminations to counterbalance Galbraith’s views. 
These appendages to the series, like the criticisms of Galbraith from the 
conservative press, dwelled repeatedly on several themes. Galbraith, they 
argued, was a member of an academic elite who sought to run the country 
themselves. Ronald Reagan had become expert in this rhetorical mode 
during his gubernatorial battles with the University of California. Galbraith’s 
series, he asserted in the final appended critique, implied “that leadership is 
best left to development by a group of wise mandarins on college campuses.” 
Decades of conservative populism had inspired him and his colleagues to 
associate arguments from the academic left with expressions of elitism. 
Presumably Reagan’s sympathies could be trusted to lie with a broader public 
instead.22 Even as some of Galbraith’s critics castigated him for his 
connections to the establishment, others tried to radicalize his views in order 
to marginalize them from mainstream policy debates. William F. Buckley Jr. 
represented Galbraith as an “avowed socialist” in the thrall of “his lifelong 
mistress, the state.”23 The Age of Uncertainty, Albro Martin asserted in his 
remarks, “mocks the history of America, demeans it, makes it something to 
be ashamed of.”24 Drawing on an argument that Friedrich Hayek had long 
promulgated, commentators also interpreted his views as the product of a 
misguided rationalism. Galbraith seems, Reagan argued, “to believe that it is 
a simple matter to identify what the community interest is.”25 Here Reagan 
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cast himself as the defender of complexity: the virtue of capitalism, in his 
view, was that it bypassed many of the thorny problems of collective action 
by simply deferring to consumer choice. In Encounter, Kenneth Minogue 
drew attention to Galbraith’s assertion in the book version of The Age of 
Uncertainty that “few social problems, if any, are difficult of solution,” in order 
to highlight the imputed arrogance of planning. “Professor Galbraith 
believes that social and political problems are essentially simple,” he wrote; 
“I believe them to be essentially complex” (Minogue 1978). 
The final, and perhaps most effective, argument that critics leveraged 
against Galbraith was that he did not have sufficient credibility within the 
discipline to author a series of this kind. Galbraith maintained a public 
persona that was more common in Britain than the United States, deriving 
his authority from both elite social connections and an ability to engage with 
questions of public policy in terms that a layperson could understand. Many 
American economists remained skeptical of this model, seeking instead to 
justify their public authority in terms of technical accomplishments as judged 
by a small community of disciplinary peers (Fourcade 2009). Those who 
disagreed with Galbraith were quick to use such arguments to discredit his 
views among those who might otherwise be receptive. Milton Friedman was 
uniquely well positioned to launch just such an attack. His recent receipt of 
a Nobel Prize had provided him with an impeccable disciplinary signifier of 
technical accomplishment that Galbraith conspicuously lacked. Unlike most 
recipients of the prize, Friedman had also demonstrated—in both his 
Newsweek columns and Capitalism and Freedom—a capacity for engaging 
economic questions in a language that a broad public could understand. His 
celebrity was fast approaching Galbraith’s own: media outlets covered him as 
the Harvard economist’s “principal bete noir” (Nadel 1977) and adopted the 
two of them as “helpful reference points at opposite ends of the spectrum” 
(Curley 1980). Galbraith himself joked that, in the face of the publicity 
surrounding Friedman, The Age of Uncertainty was just his bid for “a little 
equal time.”26 Friedman was capable of matching Galbraith in public stature 
while arguing that only his had been legitimately earned. 
A year before the release of The Age of Uncertainty, the market-oriented 
Institute of Economic Affairs in London recruited Friedman to give a public 
lecture on Galbraith to a group of businessmen, journalists, and political 
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leaders at a church in Westminster.27 The goals, presumably, were to undermine 
Galbraith’s credibility and provide an array of useful arguments to 
conservative intellectuals before the series aired. The extent to which 
Friedman’s analysis anticipated, and perhaps helped form, later criticisms of 
Galbraith’s series is striking. Galbraith was an “arrogant” elitist who believed 
that all questions should be solved by an intellectual “aristocracy” of which he 
was a notable member. He was (ironically, given his famous distaste for the 
profession) an “advertiser par excellence” whose views achieved wide 
acceptance because they were “easy to understand,” in contrast to the more 
challenging complexities of free market economics. And he pretended to be 
a scientist seeking answers when he was, in truth, a “missionary seeking 
converts.” His theories had never been empirically “demonstrated” and had 
“never found any acceptance in the academic world” (Friedman 1977, 17, 30–
31, 35–36). Friedman positioned himself, in contrast, as a populist who 
deferred to the opinions of the masses by leaving decisions to the decrees of 
a marketplace that was outside his control. While Galbraith attempted to 
persuade others by filtering simplistic arguments through his formidable 
literary imagination, Friedman cast himself as the defender of his own 
discipline’s scientific and empirical foundations. Galbraith, who owned a 
house near the Friedmans in Vermont and had long been a personal friend, saw 
this assault as yet another public skirmish in an ongoing political war. But, in 
contrast to his iconoclastic opponent, he had never held out much hope that his 
message would achieve traction in the public arena. He acknowledged an 
“affinity for lost causes” and implied in private correspondence that this new 
television series might be yet another. While many of his friends considered 
Friedman’s London lectures bad form, Galbraith claimed to have been 
patiently explaining to them that this was merely “what a man must do to win 
the Nobel Prize.”28 
 
Days after The Age of Uncertainty first aired in England, Milton Friedman 
received a call at his new home in San Francisco. After nearly three decades 
at the University of Chicago, he had recently resigned his post to accept a 
temporary visiting position at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
followed by a permanent appointment at the conservative Hoover Institution 
(Friedman and Friedman 1998, 471). Having purchased an apartment with the 
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proceeds from the Nobel Prize, Friedman now faced the prospect of life in a 
new city without all of the regular commitments that affiliation with a 
university economics department entailed. He was free to pursue his own 
interests for the foreseeable future to a degree that academia rarely allowed. 
But the person on the other end of the line, an executive at a small public radio 
station in Erie, Pennsylvania, was proposing to fill this newfound free time 
with a radical departure from his previous work. Would Friedman, as the 
leading free market advocate in the public sphere, consider making a 
television documentary about his own ideas? 
It was a prospect that Friedman had begun considering not long after 
learning that Galbraith was at work on a series for the BBC. In private 
correspondence, Friedman wrote that it would be “highly desirable to have 
a good deal more exposure of the ideas of liberty and freedom on television.” 
He had lobbied for the idea among program officers at market-oriented 
foundations, telling them that one of “the most effective things they could do 
would be to sponsor a regular program, preferably on commercial TV, 
presenting economic ideas in a serious way.”29 PBS executives, under political 
pressure to maintain “balance” as the release of Galbraith’s series approached, 
expressed their own enthusiasm at the idea of providing Friedman with a venue 
to express his contrary views. “I can only say again how anxious we are,” a 
vice president at the network wrote to Friedman in the summer of 1976, “to 
discuss with you at greater length the possibility of putting together some form 
of commentary or critical analysis or even ‘counter programming’ vis-a-vis 
the Galbraith series.”30 Even conservative politicians, when confronted by 
the Galbraith series, independently arrived at the conclusion that Friedman 
should develop a set of competing documentaries of his own.31 Although 
Friedman had not yet made any specific plans, upon picking up the phone in 
January 1977 he was prepared to listen. 
The executive on the other end of the line, however, was very different from 
the one who had first approached Galbraith nearly four years before. The Age 
of Uncertainty was developed from the outset by leading figures in the small 
community of producers and technicians who had invented the long-format 
public television documentary, and their work had attracted impressive 
audiences and critical accolades (Dornfeld 1998, 43). Robert Chitester, the 
executive who contacted Friedman, ran a small public-television station that was 
barely a decade old, and his most substantial programming success had been a 
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series on tropical fish called From Guppies to Groupers. And unlike the team 
that had contacted Galbraith seeking to develop an “objective” overview of the 
history of social science, Chitester wanted to sponsor the series for overtly 
political reasons. A onetime Democrat who had distributed leaflets for 
McGovern in 1972, he had experienced a dramatic political conversion after 
reading Capitalism and Freedom only months before he first contacted 
Friedman. Chitester quickly concluded that “economic freedom had to exist, or 
the rest of the freedoms could not,” and his social philosophy became “settled” 
in a way that it “had never been before” (Cox 1980, 43). The book became 
Chitester’s “Bible,” and his “faith in the market” became “absolute.” He 
dreamed of serving as an evangelist to bring Friedman’s news to a broader public 
than could be reached through his books and Newsweek articles alone. But 
Chitester was also a slightly peculiar character, who attended meetings with 
open shirts and forced colleagues to warn potential business partners that they 
would likely find him “eccentric” (Bernstein 1980, 108–9). This was a longshot 
bid. 
Although Friedman was intrigued by the prospect and flattered by 
Chitester’s enthusiasm, he initially expressed skepticism about the proposal. 
His Newsweek columns and well-received appearances on The Phil Donahue 
Show had brought him to a broader public, but he still agreed with Hayek 
that he could change popular opinion more effectively by “persuading 
economists” rather than the “public at large.” But here, as with the 
development of Capitalism and Freedom decades earlier, Rose Friedman 
pushed him to expand his rhetorical horizons (Bernstein 1980, 109). Her job 
was perhaps made easier by the near-complete freedom granted to them by 
Friedman’s new research position. After four meetings at the Friedmans’ 
apartment, they agreed to develop the series. Chitester, in a state of 
“euphoria,” quickly began planning for the enterprise. 
The “basic idea,” as Friedman informed his colleagues, was “really to put 
Capitalism and Freedom on TV.”32 But newspapers that picked up on the 
enterprise immediately saw it as a direct response to The Age of Uncertainty. 
As “the two men do not form a mutual admiration society,” the New York Post 
observed, it “should surprise no one” that “Milton is about to try something” 
at which Galbraith had “failed” (“Nobel Winner Set for TV Show” 1977). 
Whereas Galbraith’s series had obtained all its financing from public 
television outlets and struggled to maintain even a modicum of corporate 
support, Chitester and Friedman decided to raise all of their $2.8 million in 
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projected costs entirely from outside funders. Chitester set up a nonprofit entity 
with a board well stocked with Fortune 500 executives to assuage potential 
concerns about donations to a small public radio station. From the beginning, 
foundations and corporations proved enthusiastic about contributing to the 
enterprise, which allowed them to make a nonprofit donation to support the 
propagation of ideas they supported while receiving exposure among a 
wealthy public-television audience. The Olin Foundation provided space at the 
New York Athletic Club for an initial meeting to develop the concept for the 
project, and its $250,000 contribution was soon accompanied by $500,000 
from the Sarah Scaife Foundation, $300,000 from the Reader’s Digest 
Association, $240,000 from Getty Oil, and donations from eleven other 
underwriters ranging from General Motors and Bechtel to a charity fund 
managed by a maker of pressure cookers (Bernstein 1980, 108–11). William 
Jovanovich of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, who sympathized with Friedman’s 
ideas, provided financing for a preliminary lecture series under favorable 
terms (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 477). In courting support, Friedman and 
Chitester could afford to be selective: they discouraged contributions from 
major corporations, and particularly oil companies, to maintain 
representation from “small industries” and to “avoid any impression 
whatsoever that the program represented paid apologies for a particular 
segment.”33 Chitester relied on the idea that PBS, with its budget squeezed 
and its ideological orientation under constant scrutiny, would find it 
impossible to turn down a fully paid-for documentary series presented by a 
Nobel laureate. Friedman later recalled his prescience in believing that “the 
pressure to provide some balance to Galbraith’s clearly ideological series would 
make it impossible for them to refuse to broadcast a program . . . which 
presented the other side” (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 474). Friedman’s 
series was made possible by a potent combination of ideologically committed 
staff and a rapidly developing network of corporation and foundation 
support. This infrastructure, in combination with political pressure from 
conservatives in Congress and relentless critiques of media bias, established 
a model that would prove central to the propagation of free market ideas in the 
decades that followed. 
Although Friedman acknowledged that his series was inspired by 
Galbraith’s prior effort, he quite explicitly avoided using its format as a model. 
(In correspondence he conspicuously cited Bronowski as the closest analogue 
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to the format he was trying to capture.)34 Several qualities would quite 
sharply differentiate his approach from Galbraith’s. First, his series would not 
be presented under any pretense of neutrality; instead, he would unabashedly 
try to convince viewers of his philosophical perspective. Chitester marketed 
it as such to prospective funders, writing to Charles Koch that it would be “a 
strong statement on the need for a free market.”35 Rose Friedman publicly 
acknowledged that they were inspired to develop the show out of a “missionary 
instinct” (Bernstein 1980, 110, sidebar). And Friedman himself quite frankly 
stated that it was not “a series in economics” but “a personal statement of my 
own social, economic, and political values.”36 Second, the series would not 
dwell on historical subjects. Rather, it would be presented from a contemporary 
perspective, and its footage would focus entirely on real-world images of 
people and organizations who exemplified the point that he was trying to 
make. Rather than jumping around the world from instant-to-instant, each 
program would be rooted on a single problem and a few discrete locations, 
allowing Friedman to draw out his perspective with carefully chosen examples 
at somewhat greater length. Finally, the documentary footage would 
consume only a half hour, rather than a full hour, with the rest of the program 
consisting of Friedman in debate with a small group of individuals who 
expressed varying degrees of sympathy to his point of view. 
Each of these decisions had important effects on the structure and reception 
of the series and help illuminate the posture that Friedman adopted in 
attempting to persuade a broader public of his views. Friedman was acutely 
conscious that public interest in economic ideas relied partly on an appearance 
of controversy. When a journalist asked him why economics was turning into 
a combative branch of show business, he immediately replied that “nobody 
wants to hear economists talk about subjects on which they are agreeing.”37 He 
sensed that any interest that the series inspired would result from the clarity of 
his policy prescriptions, rather than the skill with which they were effaced. At 
the same time, he believed that an appearance of empiricism was crucial to 
convincing others of his views. Friedman may have readily announced his 
iconoclasm, but he repeatedly insisted that it was founded on a careful 
scientific analysis of all the available data. As work began on the series, he 
expressed a strong desire to avoid all “gimmicks” and insisted that his “own 
participation and the impact of ideas should not be diluted by obviously 
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artificial activities.” One searches in vain for any signs of reflexivity in Free to 
Choose. Instead, Friedman constantly thrust himself among the subjects of 
his analysis, leveraging the distinctive ability of visual observation to persuade. 
And he emphasized, in particular, the texture of everyday life. “If we are to rest 
our case on spectaculars, I am afraid government would not come out badly,” 
he wrote to one funder. Voyages to the moon and military endeavors had a 
certain aesthetic appeal. Instead, he wanted to focus on the successes of 
corporations in transforming the practices of “everyday humdrum life.”38 
Thus when speaking about welfare, Friedman dwelled on images from a single 
public housing project where he argued that government policies had helped 
make poverty more intractable; when discussing schools, he focused on a 
wealthy public school to criticize the taxing of the poor to fund an educational 
system that delivered superior outcomes to members of the middle class.39 
Every argument was supported by real-world footage that provided anecdotal 
validations of his claims. 
The extended discussion sessions at the end were intended, in part, to 
satisfy what he saw as the public desire for sharp disagreement and verbal 
sparring. They also implicitly addressed the mandate for public television to 
include balanced views (without requiring any appended rebuttals) and 
helped validate its star’s claims that he was engaged in an earnest and tough-
minded search for the truth. (The Wall Street Journal, not realizing that 
Friedman added these sessions voluntarily and that Galbraith had been 
required to include rebuttals, implied bias in noting that “the TV people 
subjected Mr. Galbraith to no such scrutiny” [Malabre 1980].) Perhaps most 
importantly, however, they took advantage of Friedman’s unique proficiency 
at interpersonal debate. Galbraith himself acknowledged, when asked to 
participate in these discussions, that this was a mode at which Friedman was 
superior. Applying the principle of “comparative advantage,” he informed 
Friedman that he preferred to relay his ideas in prose, as “I am far better than 
you in writing, and you are far more expert in debate.”40 Friedman—who 
filmed all of the discussion sessions over a few days at the University of 
Chicago and sought to minimize any editing—found himself on the defensive 
more often than not in his public appearances, as his interlocutors pushed back 
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against his sometimes convenient decisions about what information to 
emphasize and what to obscure.41 But the sessions provided viewers with the 
excitement of competitive punditry, and allowed Friedman to display the 
formidable forensic skills he had developed on shows like Firing Line and 
Donahue and two decades of frequent public appearances before often-
hostile crowds. 
Friedman’s self-presentation throughout the series posed a sharp contrast 
with Galbraith’s. The differences began with their height: while Galbraith 
towered over his subjects, projecting an aura of lofty superiority, Friedman 
looked up at the world with what one friendly reviewer referred to as “elfin 
charm” from nearly twenty inches below (Malabre 1980). Whereas 
Galbraith read from elaborately prepared scripts, Friedman was entirely 
extemporaneous: he began preparing his comments on the set as the crews 
were setting up their equipment and performed even the precisely timed 
dubbing sessions entirely off the cuff (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 483, 
491). Claiming that he was too “literal-minded” to understand Galbraith’s 
“more subtle allusions,” Friedman abandoned any pretense of literary style 
in favor of simple exposition.42 While Galbraith’s producers labored to shorten 
his sentences and simplify his ideas, Friedman’s praised their star for his 
reliance on “good, clean, two-syllable words” (Bernstein 1980, 110, sidebar). 
All “jargon” was avoided in Free to Choose, a reviewer in American Film 
wrote, in favor of “short sentences, simple ideas, and unsubtle illustrations” 
(Mayer 1980). Friedman’s effect on viewers was evident in the letters that 
began to arrive as the series aired. A college student expressed his gratitude 
for Friedman’s ability to develop arguments in terms that seemed 
“spontaneous” and “understandable” to the “layman viewer.”43 Another told 
him that it was “rare to find a brilliant intellectual who is so able at expressing 
his ideas so that the average person can understand.”44 Others expressed 
confusion at how such a coherent message could elude the understanding of 
academics and policy elites. “It really is so simple,” one wrote, in a message 
that was echoed by many of her peers.45 The clarity and consistency of 
Friedman’s message convinced many viewers that there were clean solutions 
to problems that other opinion leaders continued to represent as messy. While 
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Galbraith dwelled on the collapse of the certainties of earlier eras, Friedman 
was busy propounding replacements to suit the needs of his own. 
Friedman wanted his message in the series to continue reaching young 
audiences long after its network runs had concluded. Following its release 
to largely positive reviews, he devoted close and sustained attention to 
increasing its availability for students in high schools and colleges. Friedman 
had long been intrigued by the idea that college lectures should be 
videotaped by the most effective instructors in their fields and widely 
distributed, rather than entrusted to the inferior talents who inhabited most 
university positions.46 In Free to Choose, he now possessed a set of videos 
that were far more lavishly illustrated and produced than was possible in any 
conventional set of lectures. The challenge was how to price them for broad 
distribution in the era that preceded the widespread availability of 
inexpensive videocassettes. Video copies of The Age of Uncertainty had 
languished on the shelves largely because of high prices, yielding sales 
figures that distributors described as “troubling and slow.”47 Friedman’s 
sympathizers at the Americanism Educational League thereby devised a 
system in which they purchased over a dozen copies and loaned them out to 
colleges and universities for free. Within months they were lending them to 
over eighty colleges; six years later, the number was in the hundreds, and 
they informed Friedman that nearly all their copies were “out on loan all of 
the time.”48 Friedman also deemed high schools “a particularly critical 
area for affecting long-range public opinion” and courted support from 
foundations for a project to develop filmstrips and elaborate curricular 
materials for use across the country.49 And when the opportunity presented 
itself, he bought back the rights to the series to make it available on 
videocassette at minimal prices (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 502). While 
Galbraith assiduously cultivated his connections to people in positions of 
political influence, Friedman insisted from the outset of his work on Free to 
Choose that “our fundamental appeal must be to the young and not to those 
already in the establishment.”50 Ever the economist, he believed that 
reaching this audience would require close attention to pricing and 
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opportunity costs, and worked assiduously to ensure that both remained low. 
Although Free to Choose contained few novel arguments and little new 
information, the documentary series and companion volume soon became 
the most popular distillation of Friedman’s economic and political views. In 
conjunction they provided perhaps the clearest exemplar of his fully 
developed persuasive technique. In the series Friedman selfconsciously 
sought to avoid the rhetorical shortcomings of his political allies and exploit 
those of his political foes. He believed that market advocates should 
represent their views as simple in concept, populist in tone, empirical in 
methodology, and capable of solving the great problems of the modern world. 
This message found an eager audience among corporate executives and think 
tanks, and Friedman exploited these networks to disseminate his ideas among 
those whose opinions were not yet fully formed. 
Galbraith, as one might expect, was horrified by Friedman’s means of 
persuasion. He found the arguments Friedman adopted “simplistic” and 
perhaps even “purely rhetorical,” relying “almost wholly on passionate 
assertion and emotional response” (Galbraith 1981b). He marveled at the 
“radicalism” of economic ideas in the early 1980s, labeling himself a 
dispositional “conservative” by comparison (Galbraith 1981d) and 
expressing new sympathy for the rapidly receding “responsible right” 
(Galbraith 1981a). But even as he disparaged what he saw as the reductive 
extremity of Friedman’s ideas, he acknowledged that they had shifted 
public opinion far more effectively than his own. Friedman, he wrote in the 
late 1980s, was “perhaps the most influential economic figure of the second 
half of the twentieth century” (Galbraith 1987, 271). Galbraith may never 
have accepted Friedman’s economics, but he developed a reluctant admiration 
for Friedman’s ability to convince others of his views. 
 
Any study of the public life of economic ideas must confront problems of 
rhetoric and transmission, and engage with activities that extend far beyond the 
journals, lecture halls, and seminar rooms that have long formed the 
backbone of disciplinary history. The Age of Uncertainty and Free to Choose 
reveal the extent to which the nature of these public activities had changed over 
a single generation. During the final quarter of the twentieth century, the 
advocacy of economic ideas relied more heavily than ever before on dense 
layers of intermediary institutions. Those who compared the qualities of the 
respective series’ early production teams might have assumed that Galbraith’s 
establishment credentials lent him every advantage, and Friedman himself did 
not hesitate to draw on that argument when it served his ends. But the 
production of Free to Choose relied on an advocacy network that proved, 
even at this early stage, remarkably effective. In contrast to Galbraith’s 
persistent failure to attract corporate sponsorship, Friedman had little 
trouble financing his series entirely through business and foundation 
support. Even as the expensive reels of Galbraith’s series languished on 
distributors’ shelves, Friedman enjoyed help from organizations that 
developed extensive curricular materials and made pedagogical usage of the 
series free. And while Friedman’s series was released to a largely genial 
critical reception, Galbraith’s was met with a carefully orchestrated hostile 
response. The Institute for Economic Affairs arranged for public lectures, 
including Friedman’s, that would discredit Galbraith’s ideas; the Hoover 
Institution helped assemble the critical respondents whose views were 
appended to each episode; and publications including Barron’s, the Daily 
Telegraph, and the National Review, in conjunction with a number of 
Friedman’s fellow members of the Mont Pèlerin Society, met the release of the 
series with a set of sharply critical reviews. Friedman could rely on a network 
of allied institutions to provide the forms of support that this new era of 
advocacy required. 
Free to Choose was a popular success for many reasons, including 
Friedman’s disciplinary credibility, his populist persona, and the financial and 
promotional support provided by sympathetic institutions. At the center of his 
appeal, however, lay the force of the market metaphor. While Friedman’s 
rhetoric aligned well with the requirements of late twentieth-century modes 
of transmission, Galbraith never found a way to distill his views in such simple 
and broadly applicable terms. As one journalist wrote before the release of 
either documentary, to be an “economic superstar” it was necessary to arrive at 
a “fixed view of the world, learn to state it forcefully and cast unremitting 
scorn on those who disagree.”51 This may have been cynical, but it was not 
entirely untrue. The reductivism of economic debate in recent years can be 
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